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international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
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accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The ‘Look East’ policy has been a major part of India’s international 
engagement since its economic opening in 1991. Having received 
bipartisan support from successive Indian governments, the policy has 
evolved from economic and diplomatic engagement with Southeast Asia 
to broader security and defence ties across the whole Asia-Pacific. In 
recent years, India has signalled a willingness to play a greater strategic 
role in the region, deepening links with such partners as Japan, Vietnam, 
and Australia. The policy has been driven in part by India’s strategy of 
external balancing against China, but has also been motivated by India’s 
desire for a greater global role and its rise as a trading nation.  
Narendra Modi’s landslide victory in the May 2014 election provides the 
chance to build on this momentum to carve out a greater strategic role 
for India in the Asia-Pacific. China’s expanding presence in the Indian 
Ocean and assertiveness in maritime territorial disputes in East Asia has 
reinforced the relevance of an enhanced Indian role in East and 
Southeast Asia for India and its Asia-Pacific partners. Already Modi has 
indicated his intention to transform the Look East policy to ‘Act East’. 
Although the Modi Government has expressed its intention to focus 
initially on relations with India’s South Asian neighbours, its commitment 
to pursue economic growth and a more ambitious foreign policy will lead 
to an increased eastward focus.  
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The Look East policy has shaped India’s engagement with the Asia-
Pacific for over two decades, substantially deepening India’s economic, 
institutional, and security relations with the region. Initially intended to 
develop India’s economic ties with Southeast Asia, India’s engagement 
with its eastern neighbours has since shifted to include Northeast Asia 
and Australia. In recent years, Look East has acquired a strategic 
dimension with a significant naval emphasis.  
Elected with the largest electoral mandate in over 30 years, the 
government of Narendra Modi has an exceptional opportunity to 
transform India into a serious strategic player in East and Southeast 
Asia. While early foreign policy decision-making pointed to a prioritisation 
of relations within South Asia, the Modi Government has since 
demonstrated its intention to pursue a more ambitious foreign policy 
agenda, including carving out a greater global role for India. Early 
interactions with East and Southeast Asia have been positive, and 
partnerships with Japan, Vietnam, Australia, ASEAN, and Indonesia hold 
particular promise. Should the regional situation in South Asia remain 
reasonably stable, it can be expected that India under Modi will pursue a 
greater role in East and Southeast Asia in line with its growing economic 
and strategic interests. 
This Analysis will examine the future of India’s relations with East and 
Southeast Asia under the Modi Government. It first outlines the origins 
and evolution of the Look East Policy under previous governments, and 
illustrates the centrality of Look East to Indian foreign policy. Second, it 
examines the Modi Government’s early foreign policy decision-making, 
and assesses its probable impact on the development of India’s Asia-
Pacific strategy. It then identifies key relationships in the Asia-Pacific and 
looks at their likely evolution under the Modi Government. Finally, it 
analyses the external and internal factors that have the potential to 
accelerate or diminish India’s emphasis on engagement with the Asia-
Pacific. 
LOOK EAST 
India’s Look East policy was initiated under the Narasimha Rao 
Government in the early 1990s amid a worsening domestic economic 
and political situation. The geopolitical tensions leading up to the 1991 
Gulf War deeply affected India’s economy, bringing about economic 
recession and an acute balance-of-payments crisis by mid-1991.1 This 
crisis drove India to search for economic opportunities in more dynamic 
parts of Asia. In addition, the Look East policy was driven by three 
specific factors. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a strategic and 
economic vacuum for India, and the end of Cold War bipolarity reduced 
the relevance of India’s non-aligned stance. Second, China’s opening 
…Narendra Modi has an 
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just over a decade earlier prompted India to reach out to Southeast Asia 
to avoid falling into a subordinate political and economic role in the 
region. India was also driven by a desire to develop and stabilise its 
fragile Northeastern states, which were in the midst of insurgency. As 
four of the Northeastern states share a 1643km long land border with 
Myanmar, they are critical to overland connectivity with Southeast Asia.2 
These factors, combined with the Gulf Crisis, put the need to diversify 
India’s energy sources and economic partnerships into sharp focus. 
India needed to integrate into the global economy, and the dynamism of 
India’s eastern neighbours made Southeast Asia an attractive place to 
start. 
Two decades on, engagement with the Asia-Pacific has become an 
integral component of Indian foreign policy with bipartisan support. In 
2003, the geographic focus and agenda of the policy was significantly 
expanded to include Australia and East Asia, as well as broader 
economic and security issues.3 Look East has thus developed into a 
multi-pronged strategy involving many institutional mechanisms at 
multilateral and bilateral levels, economic links, and defence 
engagement.4 India’s trade with North and Southeast Asia now 
represents about a quarter of its total trade; outweighing that with the 
United States and the European Union.5 China has become India’s top 
trading partner, with bilateral trade growing from roughly $US7 billion in 
2003-2004, to $US65 billion in 2013-2014.6 In the same period, two-way 
trade with ASEAN member states has grown from approximately $US13 
billion to $US74 billion, making its trade with the region as a whole even 
more significant than with China.7  
India’s engagement with East and Southeast Asia has also developed 
strategic dimensions. In particular, as China’s relationships with India’s 
neighbours in the Indian Ocean deepen, the strategic relevance of 
India’s own connections with neighbouring Asian states in the Pacific 
Ocean will likewise grow. Importantly, China’s assertiveness, particularly 
in maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, is 
prompting Asia-Pacific nations to look to India to play a balancing role; 
demonstrated by the accelerated outreach to India by states such as 
Japan and Vietnam. With almost 55 per cent of India’s trade transiting 
through the Malacca Straits, India does not want to see these crucial 
waterways dominated by a strategic competitor.8  
Since coming to power in 2014, the government of Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has lent India’s Look East policy even greater 
momentum, unveiling an upgraded ‘Act East Policy’ during the India-
ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in November 2014.9 This is more than just 
a rebranding. The message is that India is becoming increasingly willing 
to play a more active and prominent strategic role, exemplified by 
enhanced defence diplomacy in East and Southeast Asia.  
China’s assertiveness... 
is prompting Asia-Pacific 
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Initially, Modi’s early foreign policy decision-making pointed to a 
prioritisation of relations within India’s own neighbourhood. For example, 
in an unprecedented move, Modi invited the leaders of all member states 
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, plus Mauritius, 
to his inauguration ceremony. As a further indication of the region’s 
importance to the new government, both Modi and External Affairs 
Minister Sushma Swaraj made their first overseas trips to neighbouring 
countries, Bhutan and Bangladesh.  
However, Modi’s commitment to stability in the South Asian 
neighbourhood will not necessarily come at the expense of East Asian 
engagement. India’s Northeastern states cannot be easily accessed 
from the mainland without Bangladesh’s cooperation, so positive 
relations with India’s South Asian neighbours will be crucial to enhancing 
its land connectivity with Southeast Asia.10 In addition, since becoming 
Prime Minister, Modi has advocated a ‘Look East, Link West Policy’ 
pointing to a broader Indo-Pacific conceptualisation of India’s region.11  
Prior to the 2014 election, expectations were high that Modi would build 
on Gujarat’s existing economic links with China, Japan, and Singapore 
to deepen India’s engagement with the region. India’s decision to 
upgrade its Look East Policy is a reflection of the longer-term economic 
and strategic benefits of closer relations with the Asia-Pacific. In this 
vein, the Modi Government has devoted considerable diplomatic energy 
to strengthening relations with key East and Southeast Asian partners, 
with particular emphasis on Japan, Vietnam, Australia, and ASEAN.  
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR KEY RELATIONSHIPS 
IN ASIA? 
It is clear that the Modi Government must pursue a stable environment in 
its neighbourhood before it can seek to expand its influence further 
afield. India will attempt to maintain positive relations with its neighbours, 
although not at the expense of national security. However, the Modi 
Government’s ambition of pursuing a larger global role for India, and the 
greater long-term economic and strategic potential of engagement with 
East and Southeast Asia, will necessitate the prioritisation of India’s 
relations with this region over its traditional emphasis on West Asia. How 
will this affect India’s key relationships in Asia? 
CHINA 
India’s increased engagement with the region is driven by the impact of 
China’s rise on both its bilateral relationship and the broader evolving 
security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. China’s presence in the Indian 
Ocean has increased significantly in recent years, made easier by its 
relationships with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and others. China 
has a legitimate interest in protecting its trading and energy lifelines, with 
…the Modi Government 
must pursue a stable 
environment in its 
neighbourhood before it 
can seek to expand its 
influence further afield. 
 INDIA’S NEW ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGY: MODI ACTS EAST 
 
5
 
70 per cent of its oil supply and almost 80 per cent of its total trade being 
shipped through the Indian Ocean region.12  
However, China’s presence in the region combined with its increasing 
assertiveness along its disputed border with India has given rise to the 
perception of ‘strategic encirclement’ within the Indian strategic 
community.13 According to Indian Home Ministry figures, the number of 
alleged Chinese border transgressions doubled from 2011 to 2012, and, 
in August 2014, was on track to exceed the levels of previous years.14 
India’s focus on building economic and security relations with key 
partners in East and Southeast Asia can be seen to be part of an 
external balancing strategy in response to these concerns.  
However, India’s strategic engagement with its Asia-Pacific partners 
reflects both its competition with China, and its ambitions for a greater 
global role.15 It is in India’s interest to see a multipolar order in Asia, but 
India’s motivation for engaging with the region exists independently of its 
relationship with China. India has shown a desire for a greater role in 
Asia, including as a security provider.16 India has in the past been careful 
to avoid the perception that it is attempting to contain China or intrude on 
China’s strategic space, as the swift demise of the Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue and India’s reluctance to speak out on the South China Sea 
have demonstrated. As such, it is likely to cautiously expand its influence 
in the region, while attempting to avoid overt rivalry with China.17 
Prime Minister Modi has argued for a stronger approach to China, and 
publicly criticised China’s “expansionist attitude” at a rally in the disputed 
territory of Arunachal Pradesh during his campaign.18 This sentiment 
was echoed during Modi’s September 2014 visit to Japan, where he 
remarked obliquely upon “an 18th-century expansionist mind-set: 
encroaching on another country, intruding in others’ waters, invading 
other countries and capturing territory.”19 This sentiment has had some 
of degree policy impact; Sushma Swaraj has made it clear on multiple 
occasions that India’s endorsement of the One China policy is contingent 
on China’s affirmation of a ‘One India policy’ recognising Indian 
sensitivities on Arunachal Pradesh.20 While the Modi Government is 
likely to be more strident than the UPA Government on China, especially 
in its rhetoric, it will remain a pragmatist on the relationship, and will be 
careful to balance this sentiment with the economic benefits of India’s 
relationship with China. 
Indian public opinion on China is somewhat conflicted. While 83 per cent 
of Indians believe that China will pose a security threat to India in the 
next ten years, 63 per cent would like to see relations with China 
become stronger in this same time frame.21 This tension already informs 
India’s China policy, and the relationship has long progressed along two 
distinct economic and security tracks. Despite his criticism of the 
previous government’s handling of relations with China, this pattern can 
be expected to continue under a Modi-led government. India and 
It is in India’s interest to 
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China’s bilateral trade reached $US65 billion in 2013-2014, though this 
figure is down from its peak of $US75 billion in 2011-2012.22  
High-level interactions between China and India have proceeded at a 
rapid pace since the new government’s inauguration at the end of May 
2014. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was one of the first visitors to 
India in early June, and after meeting Prime Minister Modi on the 
sidelines of the BRICS summit in Brazil, President Xi Jinping undertook 
a state visit to India in September 2014. During the visit, China 
committed to establishing two industrial parks in India, investing $US20 
billion over the next five years in industrial and infrastructure 
development projects, and enhancing cooperation on railways. While 
there was some success on the economic side of the relationship, the 
visit was overshadowed by tensions along the disputed border in 
Ladakh. Just days before the visit, Chinese troops crossed the Line of 
Actual Control with orders to construct a road 5km into Indian territory. It 
took almost ten days to negotiate a withdrawal of the troops. While the 
opacity of decision-making and proliferation of foreign-policy actors in 
China raises questions about the genesis of such incursions, if they were 
centrally directed then the incident represented a significant misreading 
of Modi on China’s part.  
Xi’s visit was the first real test of Modi’s capacity to manage the 
competitive and cooperative elements of India’s relationship with China. 
Modi raised the issue directly with Xi multiple times during the visit, 
cautioning that “even such small incidents can impact the biggest of 
relationships, just as a little toothache can paralyze the entire body.”23 
Meanwhile, Indian troops were mobilised to the border, signalling Modi’s 
reduced tolerance for the pattern of Chinese border incursions ahead of 
bilateral visits.24 In addition, just prior to Xi’s arrival a Chinese submarine 
on a long-range deployment docked in Colombo, heightening India’s 
awareness of China’s ability to sustain a presence on both its land and 
sea borders.25 Occurring just before Modi’s first trip to the US as prime 
minister, both these incidents served only to reinforce the relevance for 
India of balancing against China externally. 
JAPAN 
India’s relations with Japan are likely to be the most strongly affected by 
Modi’s election. As the most advanced Asian naval power, and as a 
potential source of considerable investment and technological 
assistance, Japan offers significant partnership opportunities as India 
deepens relations with East Asia. Japan and India are still relatively 
minor economic partners, with a bilateral trade volume of only $US16 
billion in 2013-14, and almost $US2 billion in investment in 2013.26 
In 1958, India became the first beneficiary of Japan’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) program, and it is still one of the largest 
recipients of Japanese ODA.27 Japanese ODA has supported critical 
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infrastructure projects such as the Delhi Metro, and much of Japan’s 
future investment will go towards supporting the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial 
Corridor and the Chennai-Bangalore Industrial Corridor. In an important 
convergence of developmental and strategic objectives, the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency was, in November 2014, awarded a 
contract to build approximately 2000km of strategic roads along India’s 
disputed border with China.28 Despite their somewhat underdeveloped 
relationship, there are natural complementarities between India’s and 
Japan’s economic goals. Japanese technology and investment has the 
potential to assist India in upgrading its infrastructure and manufacturing 
sector, and India’s massive consumer market and investment needs 
may present opportunities to kick-start Japan’s ailing economy.  
However, it is the strategic potential of the relationship that is most 
significant. Again, China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea and 
along the Ladakh border has created an additional impetus for closer 
India-Japan ties. The lack of historical baggage and mutual recognition 
of each other’s importance in Asia’s rapidly changing geopolitical 
situation has, in recent years, induced India to prioritise relations with 
Japan. Under the previous government, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe was the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day Parade in January 
2014.29 And Abe has long been a proponent of closer India-Japan ties, 
arguing for the creation of a Japan-and India-led ‘broader Asia’ during 
his last term as Prime Minister.30 However the test of this partnership will 
be the extent to which India and Japan commit to assisting each other in 
the event of a crisis. 
Under Modi, India’s relationship with Japan will acquire the additional 
impetus brought about by his close personal relationship with Abe. Their 
affinity has already borne results with the inauguration of a new Special 
Strategic and Global Partnership during Modi’s September visit to Japan, 
his first outside of India’s immediate region. The partnership arises from 
the two countries’ “convergent global interests, critical maritime 
interconnection and growing international responsibilities” and Japan’s 
place “at the heart of India's Look East Policy.”31 However, the inability to 
conclude a civil-nuclear deal during Modi’s recent visit to Japan 
demonstrated that progress in the relationship will not be driven solely by 
the political will of the two leaders. 
On top of a commitment to invest around $US35 billion in Indian 
infrastructure over the next five years, Modi’s trip brought about 
agreements to enhance military ties between India and Japan.32 The two 
leaders signed a Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the 
Field of Defence, and noted the importance of regular bilateral maritime 
exercises and Japan’s participation in Exercise Malabar with India and 
the United States.33 The liberalisation of Japan’s defence export rules 
will additionally allow Japanese defence firms to fill a gap in India’s huge 
weapons market, likely beginning with the ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious 
seaplane.34 Maritime security remains a natural avenue for partnership 
China’s assertiveness... 
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for the two Indo-Pacific powers, adding the potential to involve other 
regional navies such as Australia’s.35 
ASEAN 
Although ASEAN has been at the heart of India’s Look East Policy since 
its inception, Modi’s announcement of the Act East Policy during the 
2014 India-ASEAN Summit reinforces the centrality of the institution to 
India’s engagement with countries to its East. China’s assertive stance 
on disputed territories has given India the opportunity to enhance its 
strategic presence in Southeast Asia, and ASEAN states are 
increasingly looking to India to play a balancing role in the region. 
Sushma Swaraj gave expression to this sentiment at the 12th India-
ASEAN meeting in Nay Pyi Taw saying: “The ASEAN-India strategic 
partnership owes its strength to the fact that our ‘Look East’ to ASEAN 
meets your ‘Look West’ towards India.”36 However, India’s recent 
economic decline combined with the policy paralysis that afflicted the 
UPA Government in its final years, means that India will need to work 
particularly hard to convince ASEAN that it is serious about becoming a 
reliable partner with an expanded security profile in the region.  
India and ASEAN elevated their relationship to the level of a strategic 
partnership in 2012. The Indian Navy has thus far played a crucial role in 
deepening India’s security partnerships with ASEAN states, through joint 
patrols, bilateral exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; 
and multilateral engagement, including the biennial MILAN exercises at 
Port Blair since 1995.37 While India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command 
presents a natural base for India to project power through the Malacca 
Strait into the waters of East Asia, the Indian Navy has also begun a 
significant rebalancing of its fleet from its Western to Eastern Naval 
Command, which is now the larger fleet in terms of major warships.38 On 
the political level, Modi’s government has maintained its commitment to 
the previous government’s pledge to open a new diplomatic mission to 
ASEAN in 2014, as well as potentially seconding an officer to the 
ASEAN Secretariat.39 In August 2014, Sushma Swaraj announced 
India’s intention to begin drafting its next India-ASEAN action plan, with 
an emphasis on increasing connectivity in the region to boost trade and 
people-to-people links.40 In terms of connectivity, economic and 
infrastructure development in India’s Northeastern states will be crucial. 
As the only overland connection to mainland Southeast Asia, the 
strategic utility of these states has become even more salient since 
Myanmar began greater global engagement. 
VIETNAM 
Of India’s Southeast Asian partnerships, its relationship with Vietnam is 
arguably the most strategically significant. Vietnam’s increasingly tense 
relationship with China and its dominant geostrategic position in 
Indochina and the South China Sea makes Vietnam a natural partner for 
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India to balance against China in its own neighbourhood. With a view to 
enhancing political, defence, and security engagement, and bringing 
about closer economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, India and 
Vietnam elevated their relationship to the level of a strategic partnership 
in November 2007.41 The Modi Government has deliberately and rapidly 
accelerated its high-level engagement with Vietnam. Sushma Swaraj 
and President Pranab Mukherjee undertook official visits to Vietnam in 
August and September 2014 respectively; India hosted Vietnamese 
Prime Minister Dung in October 2014; and Prime Minister Modi has 
accepted Prime Minister Dung’s invitation to undertake an official visit to 
Vietnam at a mutually agreeable time. 
The economic relationship between India and Vietnam is fairly minor, 
ranking only 29th among India’s top bilateral trading partners. That said, 
in the past five years, trade between India and Vietnam has more than 
tripled.42 Indian companies are also beginning to invest in oil and gas 
exploration, mineral exploration and processing, sugar manufacturing, 
agrochemicals, IT, and agricultural processing in Vietnam, with a total 
registered capital of $US252 million across 73 projects in 2013.43 Given 
that India and Vietnam both use similar Russian defence platforms, there 
is much potential for joint training and technology transfer between the 
two. In 2011, the Indian Navy offered Vietnamese forces facilities for 
training and capacity building, reportedly in return for berthing rights at 
Nha Trang.44 
China is suspicious of India’s growing partnership with Vietnam, not least 
because of its potential to draw India into the South China Sea. In 
October 2011, India’s state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited 
signed an agreement with Vietnam to expand and promote oil 
exploration in the South China Sea, and was issued with a demarche 
from China in November that same year. Despite China’s protestations 
that the exploration of Blocks 127 and 128 is in violation of its 
sovereignty, ONGC Videsh went ahead with the projects. More recently, 
during Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung’s visit to India in October 2014, 
ONGC Videsh and PetroVietnam signed a mutual cooperation 
agreement on the exploration of several South China Sea oil blocks.45 
The China dimension of India-Vietnam relations was clearest in 
President Mukherjee’s visit to Hanoi. Mukherjee visited Vietnam just 
ahead of Xi Jinping’s trip to India, at the same time that President Xi was 
visiting India’s neighbours the Maldives and Sri Lanka, where a Chinese 
submarine was stationed at the time. Although not necessarily 
intentional, the timing of the visits sent a clear signal that India intends to 
build relations with China’s neighbours in the same way China has done 
in the Indian Ocean. The joint communique from this visit reaffirmed 
India’s regard for Vietnam “as an important pillar in its Look East Policy,” 
and expressed Vietnam’s support for both the policy and India’s 
increasingly important role in regional and international forums.46  
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The joint communique also expressed support for freedom of navigation 
in the South China Sea. This message of support for Vietnam’s security 
was reinforced by the extension of a $US100 million export credit line for 
defence deals, and hints that New Delhi and Hanoi were discussing a 
proposal to supply BrahMos anti-ship missiles to Vietnam.47 These 
sentiments were echoed during Prime Minister Dung’s visit the following 
month, and India also outlined its intention to assist in the modernisation 
of Vietnam’s defence and security forces through expanded training, 
joint exercises, and cooperation on defence equipment.48 Should the 
BrahMos deal go ahead, the sale of this supersonic anti-ship missile has 
the ability to significantly bolster Vietnam’s maritime deterrence against 
China. 
INDONESIA 
Indonesia also stands out as a natural partner for India. Not only do the 
two multi-ethnic Asian democracies have longstanding historical and 
cultural ties, Indonesia’s geostrategic location on the Malacca and 
Sunda Straits further reinforces the benefits of closer engagement for 
India. New Delhi and Jakarta had a short-lived post-independence 
history of closer engagement brought about by cooperation in the Cold 
War-era Non-Aligned Movement, and reviving this existing engagement 
would reinforce the strategic evolution of India’s Look East policy. 
Indonesia has now become India’s largest bilateral trading partner in 
ASEAN, with a total value of more than $US19 billion.49  
Despite concluding a Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2001 and 
inaugurating a Strategic Partnership in 2005, defence relations between 
India and Indonesia are underdeveloped. Defence cooperation has 
comprised ship visits, officer exchanges at staff colleges, and joint 
coordinated patrols in the mouth of the Malacca Strait, and there has 
been some progress on joint naval exercises since 2012. Given that the 
two Indian Ocean neighbours are separated by a mere 80 nautical miles 
of water, there is much unrealised potential for greater cooperation on 
maritime security.50 The relevance of this is clear in light of President 
Jokowi’s stated vision of Indonesia as a global maritime axis.51 Although 
involved in a latent disagreement with China over the sovereignty of the 
Natuna Islands, Indonesia is not a claimant in the main South China Sea 
dispute.52 India and Indonesia’s interests in Asia’s maritime territorial 
disputes are closely aligned in this regard, linked to regional stability and 
freedom of navigation, rather than support of others’ specific claims. 
Therefore, Indian security engagement with Indonesia will not 
automatically ring alarm bells for China. 
In late 2013, the previous UPA Government committed to annual 
bilateral summits with Indonesia, a privilege extended thus far only to 
Russia and Japan. Prime Minister Modi met President Jokowi briefly on 
the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in November and invited him to 
visit India.53 Although Jokowi will be unlikely to initially prioritise foreign 
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policy, Modi would be wise to capitalise on this momentum.54 Increasing 
India's engagement with Indonesia could also be advantageous for the 
Modi Government from a domestic political perspective. Championing 
ties with the world's largest Islamic nation would help to build Modi's 
secular credentials and reduce concerns over his perceived anti-Muslim 
leanings. 
AUSTRALIA 
Australia also has the potential to play a significant role in India’s 
eastward shift in focus. Australia-India relations have, in recent years, 
suffered from inattention, although they have been on an upward 
trajectory since the low point of the 2009-2010 attacks on Indian 
students in Australia. With new leaders in both Australia and India, there 
is fresh potential to reinvigorate ties between the two Indian Ocean 
democracies. Australia and India have a bilateral trading volume of 
almost $US10 billion, although the relationship has declined by almost 
20 per cent in the last year.55 
A recent visit to Australia by Prime Minister Modi showed that he and 
Prime Minister Abbott are well aware of the opportunities in the 
relationship, and early signs point to a greater prioritisation of Australia in 
Indian foreign policy calculations. The beginning of the Modi 
Government’s term has witnessed an unprecedented level of 
engagement between the two Indian Ocean democracies, in both 
bilateral and multilateral contexts. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott 
was the first foreign leader to visit India since the Modi Government’s 
inauguration, marking the first time the two leaders had met. The visit’s 
highest profile outcome was the conclusion of an Australia-India civil 
nuclear cooperation agreement, pending final arrangements on 
safeguards. Aside from the economic benefits of nuclear commerce 
between the two states, the conclusion of the deal has removed a major 
source of mistrust from the relationship, signalling that Australia 
considers India a responsible nuclear power.56  
Modi reciprocated in November with a full bilateral visit after the G20 
Leaders’ Summit, the first by any Indian Prime Minister in nearly three 
decades. In an address to the Australian Parliament, Modi outlined his 
view of Australia “as a major partner in every area of our national 
priority,” noting that “Australia will no longer be at the periphery, but at 
the centre of India’s vision.”57 Prime Minister Modi also used the visit to 
reach out to Australia’s significant Indian-Australian community, 
addressing a 16 000-strong crowd of Indian community groups in 
Sydney.  
The visit resulted in a number of tangible outcomes, and Prime Minister 
Abbott voiced his intention to conclude a free trade agreement with India 
by the end of 2015. The most notable agreements included a 
Framework for Security Cooperation to consolidate and provide direction 
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for Australia and India’s expanding defence and security ties. This 
agreement has the potential to allow Australia and India to add 
substance to their ‘strategic partnership’ declaration signed in 2009. As 
Indian Ocean powers, maritime security and naval cooperation is a 
natural avenue for Australia and India to pursue closer coordination: 
bilateral naval exercises are due to begin in 2015.58 But almost 
overshadowing the formal agreements was the evident warmth in the 
personal relationship between Abbott and Modi. The personal 
connection between the two leaders was highlighted through their liberal 
use of social media through the visit, and Abbott went as far as to liken 
Modi to a brother.  
EVALUATING MODI’S LOOK EAST POLICY 
India has been pursuing closer engagement with the Asia-Pacific for 
over two decades now. In order to be transformative, however, the Modi 
Government must look beyond what has already been pledged to 
pursue serious and deep strategic partnerships throughout the region.  
This seriousness would be gauged through a number of indicators. On 
the political level, there would need to be greater engagement with East 
and Southeast Asian partners, and greater diplomatic resourcing 
throughout the region. There would also need to be more active 
involvement in relevant multilateral institutions, such as the East Asia 
Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC, to which India has applied 
for membership. On the economic front, it can be expected that India’s 
trade engagement with existing East and Southeast Asian partners will 
continue. But the extent to which India is willing to liberalise its domestic 
restrictions to allow greater levels of foreign investment will be a clearer 
indication of India’s commitment to strengthening relations with the Asia-
Pacific, particularly with regard to Japan. Finally, a key indicator will be 
enhanced defence cooperation and assistance, including joint exercises, 
defence transfers, and financial or technological assistance. Conclusion 
on the sale of advanced weaponry to the region, and naval cooperation, 
particularly in trilateral arrangements, will be of particular significance. 
In recent years, it is clear that India’s engagement with East and 
Southeast Asia has been driven primarily by the challenge of responding 
to China. As such, the kind of regional relationships pursued by the Modi 
Government will be affected by the way China’s ties with India and its 
other neighbours continue to develop. Should China persist with its 
current accelerated rate of incursions along India’s disputed border, or 
should China’s presence in the Indian Ocean acquire a significant 
military dimension, India is likely to pursue a deeper relationship with 
critical partners such as Japan, Vietnam, Australia, ASEAN, and 
Indonesia. Similarly, should China’s assertive behaviour in maritime 
territorial disputes in Asia continue to be regionally destabilising, it can 
be expected that states in East and Southeast Asia will look more 
…a key indicator will  
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seriously towards India to assume an influential role in the region’s 
security architecture. 
India’s evolving relationship with the United States will also influence its 
engagement with East and Southeast Asia, given the continuation of 
America’s critical role and its stake in the region’s security. The United 
States has for some time expressed a desire for an enhanced global role 
for India. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, drafted at the peak of 
India’s economic ascendancy, recognised that India would be likely to 
assume a more influential role in global affairs, and contribute to Asia as 
a net security provider in line with its growing military capabilities.59 As 
US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton encouraged India “not just to look 
East, but to engage East and act East,” a sentiment that has continued 
to be echoed by senior officials in the State Department more recently 
despite India’s subsequent economic slowdown.60 A closer US-India 
relationship will be likely to result in more active Indian involvement in 
East and Southeast Asia. Opinion polling has shown that Indian public 
sentiment towards the United States is warmer than towards any other 
country, and while 83 per cent of Indians consider US-India relations to 
be strong, 75 per cent would like the relationship to become stronger 
over the next ten years.61 Thus far, the Modi Government appears 
serious about developing a more substantial partnership with the United 
States, as demonstrated by the breadth of Modi’s first visit to the United 
States in October 2014 and the invitation for President Obama to visit 
India as Chief Guest for Republic Day in January 2015. In all this, 
access to advanced US military technology is likely to be a key objective 
for India.  
OBSTACLES TO REALISING THESE AMBITIONS 
India’s engagement with East and Southeast Asia will, to some extent, 
be contingent on the regional situation in South Asia. Indian public 
opinion reveals that Pakistan is still perceived to present the greatest 
threat to Indian security in the next ten years, with Pakistani-launched 
terrorism the primary reason for this level of threat perception.62 This is 
particularly salient in light of Al Qaeda’s announcement of a new South 
Asia ‘branch’ in September 2014 and wider concerns about a potential 
South Asia dimension to the rise of Islamic State. Should relations with 
Pakistan substantially deteriorate, or a major Pakistan-backed terror 
attack occur on Indian soil, it should be expected that India’s primary 
international focus will revert swiftly to its own neighbourhood. 
Destabilisation in the countries to India’s west could also impact on 
India’s pursuit of its interests in East Asia. As 68 per cent of India’s 
imported oil and $US30 billion of remittances come from millions of 
Indian workers in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East will continue to be of 
significance to India. 63 The power vacuum and resultant instability that 
may follow the US withdrawal from Afghanistan also has the potential to 
shift much Indian attention from east to west. Even so, and despite ties 
The United States 
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with Israel, which Modi seems keen to enhance, West Asia is not likely 
to grow as a priority for India it the same way as the Asia-Pacific. In any 
case, Modi’s advocacy of a “Look East, Link West” policy suggests that 
his broader foreign policy vision is connected to success in both 
spheres.  
India’s ability to pursue a more ambitious role in the Asia-Pacific will also 
face domestic constraints. India’s economy is just beginning to recover 
after it slumped to growth rates of less than 5 per cent.64 Should Modi fail 
to kick-start India’s economy, another slowdown will constrain his 
ambitions for India to become a larger regional and global player, and 
undermine his political freedom of movement domestically. Not only will 
a prolonged period of lower growth reduce India’s capacity to commit 
resources to the region, it will also diminish its credibility in the eyes of 
regional partners. India is still in the early stages of developing its ability 
to project and sustain its naval presence beyond the Indian Ocean, and 
continued increases in the naval budget and improvements to India’s 
defence infrastructure will be necessary to achieve this. As a geographic 
outsider to the Asia-Pacific, India will continue to rely on its partners, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, to project power east of Malacca, further 
reinforcing the need for it to prove itself a credible partner in the first 
place. 
CONCLUSION 
In its first months since assuming office, the Modi Government has 
signalled its intention to pursue serious engagement with the Asia-
Pacific and prioritise high-level interactions with China, ASEAN, 
Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia. Modi’s overwhelming 
electoral victory has not only afforded his government the opportunity to 
pursue a serious strategy in the Asia-Pacific, but has enhanced the 
perception of India as an attractive security partner in the region. Deeper 
engagement with the region will align with Modi’s intentions to revitalise 
Indian economic growth and carve out a more prominent global role for 
India.  
In addition, prioritising relations with India’s East and Southeast Asian 
partners will fulfil India’s broader strategic objectives of balancing against 
China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s assertive 
stance in its border dispute with India and maritime territorial disputes in 
the Asia-Pacific is increasing the relevance of a stronger Indian 
presence in the region. If it is able to carefully manage Chinese 
sensitivities, cautious Indian engagement has the potential to act as a 
stabilising force in the region. 
India under Modi will likely pursue a more ambitious role in East and 
Southeast Asia centred on practical partnerships with Japan, Vietnam, 
and Australia, and multilateral engagement with ASEAN. India’s partners 
in the region can expect greater Indian involvement in multilateral 
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maritime security initiatives, particularly in the areas of humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, transnational crime, and joint bilateral 
naval exercises. Accordingly, Australia and other partners should 
encourage a more active Indian role in regional multilateral institutions in 
order to support its foreign policy reorientation towards the region.  
However, India will be unlikely to engage in any security initiatives that 
could be perceived as threatening or containing China. In the near term, 
it would not be realistic to expect India to take an active position on East 
Asia’s maritime territorial disputes, beyond its declared support for 
principles such as freedom of navigation. 
In the past, India has neglected to articulate a clear vision for its strategic 
ambitions in East and Southeast Asia. Historically it has suffered from 
strategic timidity and poor defence planning that has impeded its ability 
to integrate itself into the Asia-Pacific.65 To establish the seriousness of 
India’s commitment to the region, the Modi Government must 
demonstrate that Act East is more than just a rebranding of an existing 
policy. In order to preclude further inertia, India will need to move quickly 
to outline a clear agenda for deepening economic, institutional, and 
defence links with the region that go beyond what has been pledged by 
previous governments. If the Modi Government is able to achieve this, 
then India has the potential to assume a role as a consequential 
strategic player across the wider Indo-Pacific. 
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